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UNCONSCIONABLE AMATEURISM:
HOW THE NCAA VIOLATES ANTITRUST BY
FORCING ATHLETES TO SIGN AWAY
THEIR IMAGE RIGHTS
BRIAN WELCH*

NCAA POLICY AND THE O'BANNON COMPLAINT
The story of Ed O'Bannon is not uncommon among former
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) athletes. In 1995,
he was the greatest college basketball player in the world.' He was
an NCAA champion, the recipient of the Wooden Award for the
nation's most outstanding player, and a future lottery pick 2 in the
National Basketball Association (NBA) draft.3 However,
O'Bannon, who was once a can't-miss prospect, lasted only a
season and a half in the NBA, and he now works as a car salesman
INTRODUCTION TO

* J.D. Candidate, May 2011, The John Marshall Law School.
1. See Chris Chase, NCAA Riches to NBA Rags, Yahoo! Sports, June 25,
2009, http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaa/basketball/blog/the -dagger/post/NCAA-Rich
(stating
that
es-to-NBA-Rags-No-1-Ed-O-Bannon?urn=ncaab,172848
O'Bannon was the top basketball prospect coming out of high school and
realized his potential as a star basketball player by scoring thirty points and
collecting seventeen rebounds in the NCAA National Championship game).
The article goes on to lament O'Bannon's career as one that started with
promise and inevitably peaked too soon, as he obtained college glory, but
fizzled as he never obtained the same type of glory as a professional player. Id.
2. National Basketball Association, Evolution of the Draft and Lottery,
http://www.nba.com/history/draftevolution.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
Beginning in 1990, the NBA adopted a weighted system so that the team with
the worst record in the league would have the highest odds at obtaining the
top pick in the league. Id. Under this system, fourteen balls are placed in a
drum and randomly drawn so that when four balls are drawn, there are 1001
possible outcomes. Id. Prior to the draft, each team is assigned a number of
combinations based on their record in the previous season. Id. The top three
picks are determined by picking balls and then the following picks are
determined based on the teams' records in the previous season. Id. There were
thirteen teams eligible under this system. Id. In the 1995 NBA draft, Ed
O'Bannon was selected in the lottery with the ninth overall pick by the New
Jersey Nets. Chase, supra note 1. He was thought by many to be capable of
turning the Nets' historically poor fortunes around. Id.
3. Dave Sheinin, From the Court to the Sales Floor, WASHINGTON POST,
June 14, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06
/11/AR2009061103332.html; Paul Gutierrez, UCLA Hero Ed O'Bannon is
Right at Home in Las Vegas Selling Cars, SI.cOM, Mar. 18, 2009, http://sportsi
Ilustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/the bonus/03/18/obannon/index.html.
533
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in Las Vegas, Nevada. 4 In July 2009, he attempted to bolster his
earning power, and that of every other former collegiate athlete,
by filing a class action lawsuit against the NCAA and the
Collegiate Licensing Committee (CLC). This antitrust case alleges
violations for the continued use of O'Bannon's and other former
athletes' images for profit, and without compensation, after their
collegiate careers ended.5 Currently, the annual market for
collegiate licensed merchandise stands at $4 billion.6 As a result,
the implications of a potential victory for O'Bannon are colossal.7
This Comment will explore the antitrust implications that Ed
O'Bannon's suit will have on the NCAA and its marketing
partners now and in the future. In doing so, this Comment will
place particular emphasis on the bargaining practices used by the
NCAA that allow for it to obtain perpetual licensing rights over
athletes' images.
Part I will give background on Ed O'Bannon's complaint
against the NCAA and investigate what may make his case a
viable antitrust attack against the NCAA. Part II will apply
antitrust law to O'Bannon's lawsuit, assessing potential antitrust
arguments for and against current NCAA practice in securing
athletes' image rights. In Part III, this Comment will propose
several alternatives to the NCAA's amateurism policies and
evaluate the consequences arising from those alternatives. Finally,
Part IV of this Comment will summarize the previous arguments
and suggest the best method for the NCAA to move forward and
avoid future antitrust claims.
In order to understand the antitrust implications of the
NCAA's amateurism policies, it is important to understand the
arguments in O'Bannon's complaint and the legal history of the
NCAA and antitrust claims.

4. Sheinin, supra note 3; Gutierrez, supra note 3; Dan Wetzel, Making
NCAA Pay?, YAHOO! SPORTS, July 21, 2009, http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaalbaske
tball/news?slug-dw-ncaasuit072109&prov-yhoo&type=lgns.
5. Wetzel, supra note 4; Complaint at 2, O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, No. 09-3329 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2009).
6. Collegiate Licensing Company, http://www.clc.com/clcweb/publishing.n
sflContent/history.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2011); Complaint for O'Bannon,
supra note 5. O'Bannon's complaint notes that the CLC has a relationship
with the NCAA as "official licensing representative," which helps create this
$4 billion annual market. Id. 5.
7. Michael McCann, NCAA Faces Unspecified Damages, Changes in Latest
Antitrust Case, SI.coM, July 22, 2009, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/wr
iters/michael_mccann/07/21/ncaa/index.html; Darren Rovell, NCAA Put on
Defensive with Another Lawsuit, CNBC.cOM, July 22, 2009, http://www.cnbc.c
om/id/32085150.
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How ED O'BANNON's DISPUTE
WITH THE NCAA AROSE

AMATEUR ATHLETICS:

A. O'Bannon's Complaint
Ed O'Bannon filed a civil complaint in the Northern District
of California in July 2009 against the NCAA, the CLC, and other
co-conspirators. 8 In the complaint, O'Bannon alleges that the
NCAA has unreasonably restrained trade to commercially exploit
former NCAA athletes into their post-collegiate lives.9 Sources of
revenue from which the NCAA and its partners allegedly exploited
current and former athletes include DVD sales, jersey sales, video
games, and corporate advertising, to name a few. 10
8. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5. The complaint defines the CLC
as a licensing team that manages licensing rights for two hundred institutions
and seventy-five percent of the college licensing market. Id. 36. The coconspirators alleged are Electronic Arts (EA) and various unnamed coconspirators including NCAA member schools and conferences. Id. 11 38-40.
With regard to EA, O'Bannon alleges that the video game maker and the
NCAA have conspired for financial benefit by using identical video game
135-48. Furthermore, the
likenesses of current and former players. Id.
complaint states that the NCAA and EA allow third parties to create and
market modifications that allow users to upload complete roster information
145-46.
for current and classic teams in order to benefit financially. Id.
This is interesting in light of recent developments in the Northern District of
California, where the former quarterback for the University of Nebraska,
Samuel Keller, has filed a class action lawsuit against NCAA and EA for use
of player images that violate the class' right to publicity. Complaint, Keller v.
Elec. Arts, No. 09-1967 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2009). See also Mark Kriegel, NCAA
Video Game Stance is Pure Hypocrisy, FOX NEWS, July 25, 2009,
http://msn.foxsports.com/cfb/story/9844702/NCAA-video-game-stance-is-pure-h
ypocrisy (stating that the NCAA's stance on video game images is hypocritical
when EA can replicate players down to the way they wear their socks, yet do
not have to compensate players so long as their name is not used in the game);
Steve Wieberg, Ex-QB Sues NCAA, EA Sports Over Use of Athletes' Likenesses,
7
USA TODAY, May 7, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2009-05-0 keller-ncaa-easports-lawsuitN.htm (comparing the video game "QB #5" of
Arizona State to the real Keller, who shares the same height, weight, hair
color, home town, and year in school).
9. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, 6. See also id. 1 2 (stating that
the NCAA and the CLC violate antitrust laws by engaging in price fixing and
group boycott barring former athletes from ownership of, or compensation for
use of their images following the end of their college careers).
104-65. The complaint seeks unspecified damages from the
10. Id.
NCAA and its partners for their profits derived from a number of sources. Id.
C. The sources of illegal use named in the complaint are: media rights for
televising games, DVD and On-Demand sales and rentals, video clips sales to
corporate advertisers, photos, action-figures, trading cards, posters, video
104games, rebroadcasts of classic games, jerseys, and other apparel. Id.
65.
While the damages are unspecified because the size of the class and the
exact monetary relief requested by the class are not yet calculated, the
complaint requests disgorgement of profits earned from illegal sales of former
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The complaint further alleges that the NCAA uses its bylaws
to deliberately force eighteen-year-old college students to
perpetually release their image rights for the financial benefit of
the NCAA and third parties with whom it contracts." O'Bannon
argues that the NCAA accomplishes student-athletes' adherence to
these bylaws by requiring all athletes to release their rights each
year. 12 This process requires athletes to sign a document titled
"Student-Athlete Statement," currently known as "Form 08-3a."13
The complaint states that Form 08-3a is a tool used by the NCAA
to unconscionably obtain perpetual ownership of image rights of
college athletes through consent that is "coerced and uninformed
and is even signed, in some cases, by minors." 14
athletes' images, and three times the amount of damages incurred by the class
as a result of the damage caused by the defendants and alleged coconspirators. Id. T C-D. Furthermore, O'Bannon seeks declaratory relief for
all current and former athletes declaring any release statements, such as
Form 08-3a, be made void and unenforceable for causing the class members to
give up their right to compensation for the use of their images. Id. F.
11. Id.
10. O'Bannon specifically refers to Article 12.5.1.1 of the NCAA
Bylaws, a section titled "Institutional, Charitable, Educational or Nonprofit
Promotions," which requires student-athletes to release their image rights to
the NCAA, its member schools and conferences, and third parties with whom
the NCAA contracts (such as CLC or Electronic Arts video games), allowing
these entities to benefit financially through this "Institutional, Charitable,
Educational, or Nonprofit promotions release". NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 2009-10 NCAA DIVISION 1 MANUAL 71 (2009),
available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-3934-2009-2010-ncaa-divisioni-manual.aspx.
12. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, 1 9..
13. Id.
59. The title of this document changes each year, in connection
with the year in which it is administered. Id.; See infra notes 17-19 (noting the
specifications of Form 08-3a and its origins in NCAA Bylaws 12.5.1.1, 14.1.3.1,
and 30.12). See generally NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
FORM 08-3A ACADEMIC YEAR 2008-2009, STUDENT-ATHLETE STATEMENT
DIVISION 1 (2008), available at http://www.ukathletics.com/doclib/compliance
0809_sa_statement.pdf (stating that student-athletes, by signing the Form 083a, affirm their eligibility for NCAA athletics and accept the provisions of the
NCAA Manual and its regulations).
14. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, IT 66-69. The complaint later
alleges that the form is unreasonably ambiguous because no reasonable
person would interpret the terms provided by the form, such as "support
educational activities" or "promote NCAA championships or other NCAA
events" to grant an unending license of student-athletes image rights to the
NCAA and its partners for perpetual use and profit. Id. 1 69. Moreover, the
complaint contends that Form 08-3a is intentionally misleading, incomplete,
ambiguous, and signed under duress by NCAA athletes without informed
consent. Id.
9. Furthermore, the complaint accuses the NCAA of
inadequately informing student-athletes that they are relinquishing their
legal rights over the use of their images, and undermines the consent that is
given through the fact that the NCAA does not inform the students that they
may seek legal advice before releasing these rights. Id. 70. See McCann,
supra note 7 (noting that a finding in favor of O'Bannon might change the way
the NCAA defines a student's relationship with a lawyer and may force the
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B. NCAA Amateurism Rules
The amateur nature of NCAA competition is a defining
feature of collegiate sports and is a core value of the NCAA.15 This
core value is codified at section 12 of the organization's bylaws.16
Section 12.5.1.1 of the NCAA bylaws states that the NCAA (or a
third party acting on its behalf) may use the name or picture of an
enrolled student to promote NCAA events or programs.1 7 NCAA
bylaw 14.1.3.1 makes student-athlete eligibility contingent on the
signing of the Student-Athlete Statement.' 8 Later in the bylaws, in
section 30.12, the specifications for the content and administration
of the Student-Athlete Statement are set forth.19 Pursuant to these
bylaws, student athletes are required to sign a Student-Athlete
Statement, (earlier referred to as Form 08-3a) prior to obtaining
eligibility for the coming season. 20
Ed O'Bannon's suit for damages is brought on behalf of a class
comprised solely of former college athletes; however, there is an
injunctive relief class, including current and former athletes,
asking for Form 08-3a to be deemed unconscionable and
unenforceable. 21 O'Bannon believes that scholarship athletes
should live up to the amateur commitment required when they are
under scholarship. 22 However, O'Bannon argues that Form 08-3a
unfairly pressures uninformed eighteen, nineteen, and twentyyear-olds to sign in order to fulfill the obligations of their
scholarship. 23 The form is offered on an obligatory basis and
failure to complete Form 08-3a renders a student athlete ineligible
NCAA to actively teach student-athletes about the importance of counsel and
methods of obtaining a lawyer in instances like the signing of Form 08-3a).
15. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 2009-10 NCAA
DIVISION 1 MANUAL 61 (2009), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/p
-3934-2009-2010-ncaa-division-i-manual.aspx (stating in NCAA bylaw 12.01.1
that "only an amateur student athlete is eligible for participation in a
particular sport"). See also Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. v. Bd. Of Regents,
468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984) (holding that an academic tradition aligned with an
amateur character of NCAA football that requires athletes not to be paid is
what differentiates college sports from its professional counterparts). The
Court stated that this amateur nature of the sport must be maintained in
order to "maintain the character and quality of the product." Id. at 102.
16. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 15, at 61.
17. Id. at 71.
18. Id. at 127.
19. Id. at 363. Bylaw 30.12 provides that Form 08-3a must be administered
individually to each athlete by the athletic director of his school. Id. There is
no mention as to whether a lawyer may or may not be present for the
administration of this form. Furthermore, it makes no mention of perpetual
licensing of image rights to the NCAA or its partners. Complaint for
O'Bannon, supra note 5, 67.
20. McCann, supra note 7.
25-34.
21. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5,
22. Wetzel, supra note 4.

23. Id.
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to participate in NCAA competition. 24 The class action lawsuit is
brought not because of the deprivation of licensing rights of
students while in college, but because the NCAA policy has
"extended that privilege into eternity."25
C. The NCAA and Antitrust Laws
O'Bannon's complaint alleges that the NCAA and the CLC
have committed violations of federal antitrust laws by unlawfully
barring former athletes from receiving compensation for the use of
their images after their college careers have ended. 26 The antitrust
action is brought pursuant to the Sherman Antitrust Act.27 The
Sherman Act provides that "every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." 28
Despite the powerful language of the Sherman Act, however,
it is not meant to make all contracts restraining trade unlawful.
Rather, the Sherman Act only makes those contracts which are
unreasonable unlawful. 29 As a result, in order to demonstrate a
violation of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must show the following:
(1) that there is an agreement; and (2) that the agreement
unreasonably restrains trade.s0 Courts will generally apply the
"rule of reason" test to determine whether a contract unreasonably
limits competition in the open market when it does not find it to
per se violate antitrust law.31 Under this rule, the court must
weigh the circumstances of a given cause of action to decide
6, 61.
24. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5,
25. Wetzel, supra note 4. See also Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, T
13 (alleging that the concerted action of the NCAA, CLC, and alleged coconspirators is designed to avoid compensation to former players by forcing
them to sign forms that require a perpetual release of all rights regarding the
use of their images).
26. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, 1 2. See also McCann, supra
note 7 (asserting that "by requiring student-athletes to forgo their identity
rights in perpetuity, the NCAA has allegedly restrained trade in violation of
the Sherman Act, a core source of federal antitrust law").
27. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, 1 46.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
29. Bd. Of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98. The court in Regents noted that a
restraint in trade may be unreasonable based on either (1) the nature and
character of the contracts, or (2) the circumstances giving rise to the
presumption that they were intended to restrain trade. Id. at 103 (quoting
Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978)).
30. Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletics Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir.
1998).
31. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103 (applying the rule of reason to the
NCAA's mandatory structured TV plan). The court in Board of Regents states
that the per se rules as well as the rule of reason are necessary for courts to
have a basis of deciding on the competitive significance (the reasonableness) of
a particular restraint. Id.
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whether it constitutes an unreasonable restraint on competition. 32
Courts have historically taken a deferential approach to antitrust
claims against the NCAA and no antitrust lawsuit against the
NCAA's amateur restrictions has ever succeeded.33
The seminal NCAA antitrust case is National Collegiate
Athletic Association v. Board of Regents. In this case, the U.S.
Supreme Court simultaneously struck down an NCAA contract as
an antitrust violation and created what has proven to be an
insurmountable standard for antitrust challenges to amateurism
rules. 34 The Court in Board of Regents made statements that were
crippling to later antitrust suits, without even ruling on the
antitrust implications of amateurism. 3 5 The Court stated that "[i]n
order to preserve the character and quality of the 'product',
athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and
the like."36 Moreover, the Court stated that the NCAA markets the
brand of college sport, and its alignment with an educational and
amateur tradition is what distinguishes it from its professional
competition. As such, the court believed that the NCAA should be
afforded authority in safeguarding these ideals.37 Thus, while the
holding of Board of Regents would seem to exemplify mistrust for
NCAA activities with potential anticompetitive outcomes, the
effect of the dicta of the case was to allow courts to defer to the
NCAA's role as purveyor of amateurism.3 8
The cases since Board of Regents have consistently ruled
against plaintiffs bringing suit against the NCAA involving
32. Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
33. Chad W. Pekron, The Professional Student-Athlete: Undermining
Amateurism as an Antitrust Defense in NCAA Compensation Challenges, 24
HAMLINE L. REV. 24, 37 (2000).
34. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120. The court stressed that the NCAA has a
unique opportunity to maintain the purity of amateur sport as a purveyor of
the tradition, and should be given leeway in doing so. Id. However, a television
plan that limited television appearances for teams under certain
circumstances and fixed the price of televised games failed the rule of reason
and violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 99-100.
35. Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in its Second Century: Defender of
Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 339 (2007); Peckron,
supra note 33, at 38.
36. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102.
37. Id. at 101-02.
38. See Tibor Nagy, The Blind Look Rule of Reason: Federal Courts'
Peculiar Treatment of NCAA Amateurism Rules, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
331, 340-41 (2005) (noting that the effect of Board of Regents is contrary to its
holding, as no court has used the rule of reason to require the NCAA's offering
of proof that rules concerning amateurism are necessary to market college
football as different from its professional competition). The note goes on to
criticize the holding in Board of Regents as the "personal opinion" of Justice
Stevens and merely as voluntary statements that were not at issue that have
since framed the way that courts approach antitrust claims against the NCAA.
Id.
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disputes of the amateurism rules.39 The first case after Board of
Regents was McCormack v. NCAA,40 where the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals applied the rule of reason, instead of finding a per se
violation of antitrust law. The court held that the NCAA's
sanctions of a university for paying football players above the limit
set by NCAA rules were reasonable because the eligibility rules
maintained a product that was distinct from professional football
and allowed for its survival. 41 The court found that the NCAA
rules limiting compensation of athletes were meant to distinguish
the college game from the professional and to integrate amateur
athletics with academics, and as a result, the rules reasonably
furthered those goals. 42
In Gaines v. NCAA, the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee held that a player who entered the NFL
draft and attempted to return to college after going undrafted did
not have a viable antitrust claim against the NCAA.4 3 Like the
court in McCormack, the district court relied on the amateur
distinction in reaching its conclusion; flat-out rejecting the notion
that eligibility rules may be struck down by antitrust law and
reaffirming the NCAA as a purveyor of the "Athenian concept of a
complete education derived from fostering full growth of both mind
39. See Banks v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 850, 862-63
(N.D. Ind. 1990) (denying a motion for preliminary injunction regarding
enforcement of the NCAA's "no draft" rule when a player who entered the NFL
draft, went undrafted, and was denied a return to college football). The court
held that the precompetitive nature of the amateurism rules outweighed the
anticompetitive effect. Id.; see McCormack v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that restrictions on athlete
compensation were not price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act and finding
that sanctioning universities that violate amateurism rules are "justifiable
means of fostering competition .. . and therefore precompetitive.").
40. McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1345.

41. Id.
42. Id. at 1344-45. The court went on to address the plaintiffs argument
that NCAA limits on compensation limit competition because of the NCAA's
allowance of certain compensation such as scholarships. Id. at 1345. The
plaintiff further argued that the NCAA allowed athletes to be compensated
professionally in one sport while remaining eligible for amateur NCAA
participation in another. Id. The court undermined these arguments by
strongly stating, "[t]hat the NCAA has not distilled amateurism to its purest
form does not mean its attempts to maintain a mixture containing some
amateur elements are unreasonable." Id. See Banks, 746 F. Supp. at 862
(striking down the plaintiffs argument that the NCAA's rules protect a
"flawed amateurism" for allowing professional baseball players status as
amateur football players, but considers a football player who has not been
compensated professionally to be professional where he only tries out at the
NFL level). The court cites McCormack's aforementioned rationale pertaining
to "the purest form of amateurism" to maintain that NCAA rules are
reasonable. Id.
43. Gaines v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744-45 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990).
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and body" through the ideal of amateurism. 44
The same no-draft eligibility rule was challenged in Banks v.
NCAA, where the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana found the concept of amateurism absolved the NCAA of
any antitrust violation because of the pro-competitive effects of the
NCAA differentiating its product from its competition.4 5 The court
noted that Banks offered anti-competitive effects of the no-draft
rule that were credible: namely, that it would deter top college
players from entering the draft and gaining a chance to earn a
large NFL salary. 46 However, the court relied on the NCAA's
justification of amateur ideals articulated in Board of Regents as a
pro-competitive justification that outweighed Banks' antitrust
interpretation of the NCAA rules.47
Thus, the aggregate effect of Board of Regents and the
decisions that followed was to allow the notion of amateurism to
become a viable defense of justification for any anti-competitive
NCAA rules in the face of an antitrust challenge. 48
44. Id. at 744.
45. Banks, 746 F. Supp. at 862. The court noted that Banks presented
several anticompetitive effects of the NCAA's no-draft and no-agent rules;
notably, that the disputed rules "protect a flawed concept of amateurism." Id.
However, the district court found that the bylaws define amateurism, and that
the "need for such a definition is central to a procompetitive purpose." Id. As a
result, the court found the plaintiff could not demonstrate that anticompetitive
effects (that is, harm to consumer welfare from an inability to watch him play
in the NCAA during the season) outweighed the pro-competitive effect of the
NCAA's amateurism rules. Id.
46. Id. at 860. The court went on to note that the effect of this would be for
better players to remain in the NCAA, enhancing their already marketable
product while harming the instant profitability of the collegiate athletes who
feared entering the NFL draft. Id.
47. Id. at 860-61. The court articulated several purposes of the NCAA nodraft rule. It stated that it contributed to a "clear line of demarcation" between
amateur and athletic competitions while forcing NCAA athletes to focus on
their "collegiate endeavors." Id. at 861. Furthermore, the court noted that
without the rule, college players could move freely between their personal
pursuit of monetary gain and their NCAA obligations, allowing their pursuit
of profit to overshadow their responsibilities as amateur student athletes. Id.
at 860-61. In accepting the NCAA's argument, the court does note that the
NCAA certainly exaggerates their case, however, the distinction between
amateur and professional sport still controls. Id. Furthermore, the appellate
decision in this case stated that college athletes simultaneously pursue a
college degree alongside their athletic endeavors and held that the rules
provided by the NCAA are designed to preserve the honesty and integrity of
college athletics. Banks v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1090
(7th Cir. 1992). See also Nagy, supra note 38, at 355 (stating that this finding
would protect the NCAA from any later antitrust allegations in future Seventh
Circuit cases).
48. See Pekron, supra note 33, at 37-41 (arguing that since Board of
Regents, courts have simply chosen to accept the fact that college sports are
amateur in nature without factually determining whether NCAA athletics are
truly amateur by investigating whether college athletics could survive without
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D. Unconscionability

One way that a plaintiff may choose to argue that a contract
is unreasonable is to establish that it was formed
usually arises under
unconscionably. 49 Unconscionability
contractual circumstances marked by the absence of a meaningful
choice for one party (procedural unconscionability) coupled with
(substantive
the other party
terms for
unfavorable
unconscionability).5 0 For a court to find that a contract was
entered into under unconscionable terms, it generally requires a
showing that both procedural and substantive unconscionability
were present when the contract was entered into.5 1 In determining
whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable, and
consequently, whether the harmed party may obtain relief from an
unfavorable term, courts have looked at several factors including:
age, intelligence, business savvy and experience, and relative
bargaining power of the parties. 52
being labeled as amateur in nature). Pekron goes on to propose that the
dichotomy of amateurism, which courts readily accept to excuse anticompetitive rules, can be undermined by defining athletes as employees of the
universities that they attend, factually proving that college sports as they are
currently are already professionalized, and that the notion of amateurism that
courts have relied on so often violates the core of antitrust law so that the
labor that produces wealth to the NCAA and its partners goes unpaid. Id. at
41-66. See also Nagy, supra note 38, at 358-59 (contending that courts have
erroneously relied on the assumption that college athletes are amateurs
because NCAA athletics have categorized their sports as similar to
extracurricular activities). Nagy posits that rather than student-athletes,
however, NCAA players are more similar to athlete-students, whose
obligations to their team come ahead of their educational pursuits by virtue of
receipt of scholarships despite poor academic records. Id. at 359. Thus, at least
for the best players, the NCAA serves as a minor league system for the NFL.
Id. at 359-360. Furthermore, courts addressing this issue have never engaged
in sufficient fact-finding to determine whether amateurism is actually
necessary for the product of college sport to survive. Id. at 360. Instead, courts
have assumed that these rules are necessary, and have relied on the dicta, not
the holding, of Board of Regents. Id. at 358.
66-73 (arguing that Form
49. See Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5,
08-3a is anti-competitive because it coerces student-athletes to consent to
unconscionable terms).
50. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.
1965).
51. Id. In analyzing the issue of unconscionability, courts focus on the
factual circumstances of the case at bar that may point to "a gross inequality
in bargaining power." Id. Williams places particular importance on the way in
which a contract is entered into in order to come to a finding of
unconscionability. Id. The court articulates that each party to a contract must
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms contained
therein, and in circumstances where a party is not afforded this ability due to
a disparity in bargaining power, it is not likely that that injured party's
consent was ever really given to the actual terms of the contract. Id.
52. See, e.g., Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1377
(11th Cir. 2005) (articulating Georgia courts' factors for evidence of procedural
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An adhesion contract, which is a frequent but unnecessary
aspect of an unconscionable agreement, is a form contract
administered by one party to another party who has little choice as
to the terms of the agreement.53 The mere fact that an agreement
is entered into through an adhesion contract is only evidence of
procedural unconscionability and does not make a contract per se
unconscionable. 54 Rather, in evaluating an adhesion contract a
court will void terms that are unconscionable and construe any
contractual ambiguities against the drafter, but will not simply
ignore terms because they may be enforced at the detriment of the
party with less bargaining power.55 A defense of consent to a
contract raised by the drafting party can be defeated upon a
showing of procedural and substantive unconscionability that will
unconscionability as: age, education, intelligence, business acumen and
experience, relative bargaining power, ambiguity of the contract language,
fairness of the terms, and the presence of a meaningful choice); Price v. Taylor,
575 F. Supp. 2d 845, 852 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (elucidating Ohio factors of
unconscionability which include: age, education, intelligence, business
expertise, bargaining power, whether the terms of the contract were explained
to the weaker party, and whether modification was possible); Wis. Auto Title
Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 166 (Wis. 2006) (stating the same
factors as mentioned in Price, but broadening them by stating that the factors
are not limited only to those and further including the availability of
alternative sources of the subject matter of the contract).
53. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 342 (8th ed. 2004). There are several
circumstances that give rise to adhesion, among them are: the drafting party
has ample time to create the terms of the contract, inevitably creating terms
in its favor, the signing party is not familiar with the terms of the contract nor
has he/she received significant time to review the contract (often
supplemented by fine print or distorted language), a disparity in bargaining
power or a total lack of bargaining (take-it-or-leave-it contract). E. ALLEN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 296-97 (3d Ed. 1999).
54. Amer. Bankers Mortg. Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 75
F.3d 1401, 1412 (9th Cir. 1996). The court held that a mortgage contract was
not unconscionable despite the presence of elements of adhesion. Id. at 141213. Even assuming that termination clauses in the mortgage contract were
adhesive for the party seeking unconscionability, the court held that the party
seeking unconscionability had failed to establish that the disputed provisions
were not within their reasonable expectations at the time the contract was
entered into. Id. at 1412. While the contract was offered adhesively on a takeit-or-leave it basis, meeting the California requirement for adhesion, there
were alternative sources of supply from which to gain the contractual benefit.
Id. at 1413. As a result, the mere presence of an adhesion contract did not give
rise to a finding of unconscionability. Id.
55. Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 746 (Md. 2005). The
Maryland court found an arbitration agreement within a contract enforceable
despite the presence of adhesion in the bargaining process. Id. at 746-48. The
arbitration clause did not provide mutuality because it provided a lender with
a foreclosure option that was not offered to the borrower. Id. at 748. However,
the court noted that identical mutuality need not exist for a contract to be
enforceable, and as a result, the arbitration term was not so oppressive so as
to render the contract unconscionable and unenforceable despite the presence
of adhesion. Id.
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render the injured party's consent invalid, as the unconscionability
of the terms of the contract will make its content void and
unenforceable. 56
Because the law governing the issues of NCAA antitrust and
unconscionability are established and unambiguous, the pivotal
point becomes whether O'Bannon's antitrust attack introduces a
unique issue concerning amateurism that has the capacity to
overturn years of legal precedent.
II. Is AMATEURISM FOREVER PROTECTED BY COURTS?
As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court has created
what seems to be an insurmountable standard for plaintiffs who
choose to bring antitrust claims against the NCAA.67 This
standard was established in Board of Regents, and cases that have
followed have easily upheld the notion of the NCAA as the
defender of amateurism in collegiate sports.58 Furthermore, the
56. See Sean Hanlon & Ray Yasser, "J.J. Morrison" and His Right of
Publicity Lawsuit Against the NCAA, 15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 241, 277
(2008) (arguing a hypothetical case on behalf of a college athlete who alleges a
violation of his right to publicity arising out of the use of an athlete's image in
similar circumstances to the O'Bannon case). This section of the note examines
the NCAA athlete's consent, or lack thereof, to the terms of the NCAA by
signing a scholarship offer to his university of choice and a national letter of
intent. Id. at 281-83. Hanlon and Yasser argue that university athletic
scholarships are contracts of adhesion offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Id.
at 286-87. The scholarship incorporates the National Letter of Intent and the
Statement of Financial Aid, which, in turn, incorporate the NCAA's rules and
regulations. Id. at 290-91. Hanlon and Yasser then posit that the scholarship
is unconscionable because in order to receive the benefits of the athletic
scholarship, such as enrollment, tuition, and status as a student-athlete,
students are required to sign standard-form adhesion contracts; the National
Letter of Intent and the Statement of Financial Aid. Id. at 291. There is also a
gross inequality of bargaining power between the very experienced and
knowledgeable NCAA and the weaker student-athlete, particularly with
regard to the 476 pages of NCAA rules that must be accepted. Id. at 292.
Furthermore, the note argues that the contract is substantively
unconscionable because it is one-sided and harsh for athletes who must retain
amateur status without being paid for their participation, while other
organizations linked with the NCAA are unjustly enriched by using the
amateur athletes for profit. Id. at 294-96. See also Williams, 350 F.2d at 449
(noting that if consent arises out of a disparity in bargaining power that
produces contractual terms that are unreasonably favorable to one party, it is
not likely that consent, "or even an objective manifestation of his consent," was
ever given to the terms of the contract).
57. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102.
58. See Pekron, supra note 33, at 37-41 (noting that several courts have
relied on the Board of Regents dicta to rule in favor of anti-competitive NCAA
amateurism restrictions while failing to conduct the factual investigations
necessary to make a legitimate antitrust ruling). The note goes on to
undermine the Board of Regents precedent. Id. Pekron argues that Board of
Regents is precedent that courts use erroneously by relying on dicta in order to
reach a judgment. Id. at 39-40. Furthermore, the note argues that objective
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NCAA antitrust appearance of immunity is bolstered by the
McCormack case's assertion that because "the NCAA has not
distilled amateurism to its purest form does not mean its attempts
to maintain a mixture containing some amateur elements are
unreasonable."69
While courts have readily ruled against challenges to the
NCAA's amateurism rules in light of the Board of Regents dicta,
O'Bannon's action may pose a legitimate threat.60 O'Bannon is
bringing his antitrust suit for damages against the NCAA on
behalf of former athletes who wish to join the class.6 1 He argues
that the NCAA's use of athletes' images when those athletes are in
school is legal, but maintains that it is the use of these images in
perpetuity, and without compensation, that violates the Sherman
Act.62
As a result, O'Bannon does not challenge the ideal of
amateurism that the NCAA uses to defeat antitrust suits brought
against its regulations.63 Instead, O'Bannon challenges the
policies, bargaining practices, and other means that the NCAA
uses to induce college students to release their image rights (which
he concedes should be allowed) for the NCAA and its marketing
partners to use for a profit into eternity. 64 The ramifications of the
courts, carrying out the necessary factual investigations, would find that
collegiate football and basketball have strayed from the amateur tradition. Id.
at 40.
59. McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1345.
60. See generally McCann, supra note 7 (noting that while the NCAA's goal
of maintaining amateurism may be legitimate, it does not seem to apply to
former athletes, who are several years, if not decades, removed from their time
under the scope of the NCAA, and possess substantial business capabilities
and earning power).
61. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, 1 43. O'Bannon's class action
suit seeks damages for all former athletes who competed on a Division I men's
basketball or football team and wish to join the class for what he alleges as the
unlawful use of their images in perpetuity. Id. However, current athletes are
not barred from joining the class action as members of the "Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief Class," thus allowing current participants in NCAA
competition to seek relief from the alleged oppressive policies of the NCAA. Id.

1$ 43, 46.
62. Id. 1 66-67.
63. Mark Alesia, Suit Targets NCAA Over Profits from Ex-Athletes' Images,
INDYSTAR.COM, July 22, 2009, http://wap.indystar.com/detail.jsp?key-494843
&rc=sp&full=1. O'Bannon's suit is not the first antitrust case brought against
the NCAA, but what makes it unique is that amateurism rules are not at
issue. Id. While in the past, the NCAA was able to argue that it needed to
disallow compensation to its players in order to preserve amateurism, this suit
is brought because players are not paid for their likenesses after their careers
are over. Id.
64. Complaint for O'Bamon, supra note 5, $$ 58-78. The complaint
mentions specific NCAA bylaws that are meant to promote amateurism in the
NCAA. Id. However, the class action does not seek that the NCAA amateurism
rules themselves be invalidated, but seeks the invalidation of improper
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complaint are important because they present a unique challenge
to the NCAA's seemingly insurmountable antitrust armor (by not
challenging the notion of NCAA amateurism) while challenging
the practices that the NCAA uses to perpetuate its amateurism65
driven policies on a season-to-season, athlete-to-athlete basis.

A. Antitrust Analysis
The infamous dicta from Board of Regents reads:
[Tihe NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve
its character, and as a result enables a product to be marketed
which might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this role, its
actions widen consumer choice not only the choices available to
sports fans but also those available to athletes and hence can be
viewed as pro-competitive.66
O'Bannon does not challenge the NCAA's potential antitrust
violations from the perspective of a current player. However, the
implications of the case would certainly affect current NCAA
athletes in the future.6 7
As previously noted, the Sherman Act protects only against
restraints of trade that are unreasonable.6 8 To show an
unreasonable restraint of trade, a plaintiff must show that the
69
challenged action is "commercial" and that the action is illegal.
In light of the case law which has followed Board of Regents, it
would appear that any NCAA regulation in pursuit of amateurism
is reasonable.70 However, former athletes may have a number of

bargaining policies undertaken in the administration of these rules, such as
58-73. Essentially, the antitrust cause of action does not
Form 08-3a. Id.
arise because the NCAA attempts to keep its competitions amateur in nature;
it arises because refusing to compensate players for the use of their images
into eternity has no relationship to amateurism when athletes are no longer
amateurs. Id. 184.

65. Id.
66. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102. The result of such dicta was to make
the NCAA's amateurism regulations untouchable in antitrust actions. See
generally Lazaroff, supra note 35 (arguing that courts have adopted an overly
deferential approach to antitrust analysis of NCAA amateurism regulations by
simply declining to apply antitrust law or shielding the NCAA from
challenges).
67. McCann, supra note 7. McCann notes that an O'Bannon victory would
compel the NCAA to change the ways in which it interacts with players. Id.
Furthermore, he states that while O'Bannon does not seek damages for
current athletes, a victory for damages in this case would result in the
creation of a trust for current student-athletes, the contents of which would be
available to athletes upon their departure from college. Id.
68. Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 461 (3rd Cir. 1998).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
70. See generally Banks, 977 F.2d 1081 (holding that the NCAA's no-draft,
no-agent policies were valid regulations that uphold amateur ideals);
McCormack, 845 F.2d 1338 (ruling that the NCAA's eligibility rules limiting
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facts surrounding the means that the NCAA uses to secure the
rights over players' images, which may point to unreasonableness
in the NCAA's practice.71
The principle argument that the former players will rely on is
the ambiguity in Form 08-3a, which is administered by the NCAA
and signed by current players prior to participation in each
season. 72 While the NCAA purports to use its constitution, bylaws,
and Form 08-3a to secure eligibility, compliance with amateurism
rules, disclosure of academic records, and drug testing , players
will argue that the NCAA uses these statements in a manner
unrelated to image rights to secure perpetual control over the
image rights of athletes well after their college careers end.73
O'Bannon's lawyer stated Form 08-3a is "a one year contract that

compensation to players were meant to maintain amateurism in college sport
and were not unreasonable); Gaines, 746 F. Supp. 738 (finding that NCAA
eligibility rules were not subject to antitrust analysis). See also Pekron, supra
note 33, at 36-37 (noting that no antitrust lawsuit challenging NCAA
amateurism restrictions has ever succeeded and arguing that in order to
prevail in an antitrust lawsuit challenging the NCAA's amateurism rules, it is
"imperative" that a plaintiff make the court understand that amateurism is
not necessary for the NCAA to produce college athletics). This is because, as
the note argues, if the "veil of amateurism" is removed from NCAA regulation,
their activities mirror those "of any garden-variety price-fixing cartel." Id.
71. See Pete Thamel, N.C.A.A. Sued Over Licensing Practices,N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/sports/ncaabasketball/22nc
aa.html (stating that the crux of the O'Bannon suit is "Form 08-3a" and
quoting his attorney as stating that the NCAA is illegitimately allowed to
delineate what amateurism is).
72. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, 1 55-73. The complaint notes
that the provision in Form 08-3a stating that the statement concerning
promotion of NCAA championships and other NCAA events "shall remain in
effect until a subsequent Division I Student-Athlete Statement/Drug-Testing
Consent form is executed" effectively releases NCAA athletes' image rights
over to the NCAA forever. Id. $ 66. The complaint proceeds to argue that the
mandatory requirement that athletes sign a statement titled "Institutional,
Charitable, Education or Nonprofit Promotions Release" and the phrases
within reading "support educational activities" and "generally promote NCAA
championships or other NCAA events, activities, or programs" are
unreasonably ambiguous because they make no mention of a perpetual release
of image rights to the NCAA. Id. 69. Nor do the specific uses, such as DVD
sales, classic game rebroadcasts, video game sales, and the like ever appear in
the contract that the athlete signs to consent to the NCAA's ownership of
image rights. Id.
73. Id. 67. See also NCAA DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note 15, Const.
3.2.4.6, at 9 (stating that the Student-Athlete statement must be signed
annually); Id. Bylaw 14.1.3.1, at 129 (stating that the Student-Athlete
Statement is required for an athlete to retain eligibility and that the content
will be related to "eligibility, recruitment, financial aid, amateur status,
previous positive drug tests . .. and involvement in organized gambling
activities . . . ."); Id. Bylaw 30.12, at 363 (stating that the statement must be

administered prior to participation in athletic competition each year).

548

The John MarshallLaw Review

[44:533

ends when the student is no longer a student athlete."74 While the
NCAA's conduct of administering the form on a year-to-year basis
for all athletes seems to affirm this idea, its conduct in marketing
player images and likenesses in perpetuity is contrary to the
practice of repeatedly obtaining the athletes' signatures.7 5
In addition to cases such as Banks, McCormack, and Gaines,
however, the NCAA has cases working in its favor that include
antitrust challenges to amateurism rules from non-athletes.
In 2004, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania heard Pocono Invitational Sports Camp v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association where a for-profit basketball camp

sued the NCAA for antitrust violations resulting from their
amateurism recruiting rules.76 The plaintiff argued that NCAA
regulation was unreasonable because it was designed to protect
institutional (NCAA) basketball camps 77 while also threatening to
destroy non-institutional camps. 78 The NCAA countered that the
recruiting regulation is intended to protect student athletes from
being exploited.7 9 In coming to the conclusion that the recruiting
rules did not violate antitrust laws, the court strongly stated that
the NCAA rules were immune from scrutiny, as they keep with the
NCAA principle of amateurism and distinguish collegiate athletics
from professional sports.80 Because the NCAA regulations have
been upheld as protection of amateurism in student-athlete
challenges and non-student-athlete challenges alike, it is clear
that the former athletes will have difficulty overcoming the
NCAA's protection from antitrust action.
B. Is Form 08-3a Unconscionable?
One way that a former athlete may circumvent the inherent
difficulties in trying to bring an antitrust suit against the NCAA is
to argue that the NCAA's bargaining tactics in the administration
74. Thamel, supra note 71.
75. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, 66; see also Wetzel, supra note
4 (quoting O'Bannon's attorney Michael Hausfeld saying, "[The scholarship]
requires annual signing .... It's proof that the NCAA has no right over former
athletes."). Hausfeld is further quoted as stating, "[w]hat [Form 08-3a] does is
emphasize the illegality with the Association essentially saying by reason of
these annual, limited grants of right, the Association and the universities can
exercise the right to use the image of the former student-athlete eternally." Id.
76. Pocono Invitational Sports Camp v. Nat'1 Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 317
F. Supp. 2d 569, 572-73 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
77. The rules that were disputed involved an NCAA requirement that
Division I coaches only evaluate prospects at camps specifically certified by
the NCAA, a limit on the number of days in which coaches are permitted to
attend basketball camps to evaluate prospects, and a rule prohibiting coaches
from being employed by non-NCAA certified basketball camps. Id. at 573.
78. Id. at 577.

79. Id.
80. Id. at 584.
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of Form 08-3a are unconscionable. If this is the case, then its
acquisition of perpetual image rights over athletes is illegal, as it
is procured through the administration of an unenforceable
contract.81 It would appear that former athletes have a strong
basis for a showing of procedural unconscionability because Form
08-3a is an adhesion contract, administered by the NCAA every
year to young student-athletes, whose ability to attend a
university may be contingent on their signing the form to secure a
scholarship. 82 However, in order to find that a contract is void due
to unconscionability, this procedural unconscionability must be
paired with unfavorable terms that show substantive
unconscionability.83
A finding of substantive unconscionability will require a court
to weigh the benefit conferred through the signing of Form 08-3a
(namely, eligibility for participation in NCAA competition and
eligibility for an athletic scholarship) with the detriment of
perpetual release of image rights that the athlete may have been
able to profit from in his post-collegiate career. 84 Athletes will
further argue that the unfavorable terms extend to their time
under the watch of the NCAA as student-athletes.8 5
81. See Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, $$ 66-73 (asserting that
Form 08-3a is anti-competitive for a number of reasons, including: vagueness
and ambiguity regarding the perpetual release in pursuit of promotion of
NCAA events, coercion by requiring uninformed students (and even minors in
certain cases) to consent to unconscionable terms, and perpetration of this
contract through a gross disparity in bargaining power that requires student
athletes to sign non-negotiable forms with non-negotiable terms, or face the
loss of athletic eligibility).
82. See discussion, supra note 52 and accompanying text, (establishing that
procedural unconscionability can be shown through several factors including:
age, education, business acumen, ambiguity of contract language, disparity in
bargaining power, whether modification is possible, and the availability of
alternative sources of the contract's subject matter).
83. Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.
84. See Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, $$ 166-72 (arguing that
former student-athletes are exposed to harsh realities in the post-collegiate
world, including responsibility for medical bills resulting from ongoing sportsrelated injuries, debt because scholarships do not cover necessities outside of
education, and an inadequate college education that result from the sportsrelated demands placed on scholarship athletes that are not proportional to a
perpetual release of earning power related to the likeness of the college
athlete).
85. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 56, at 294-96. The article argues that
athletic scholarships are substantively unconscionable because of harsh terms,
the sum of which drastically favors the NCAA and member institutions. Id. at
294. Student-athletes can be quickly disposed of by the NCAA for the violation
of its bylaws in the event that an athlete receives payment or even allows his
name or photograph to be used without compensation. Id. at 294-95. The
result of these unconscionable policies is to unjustly enrich the NCAA,
member institutions, and its partners while inadequately redistributing the
value to student-athletes. Id. at 296.
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The most important factor for former players regarding their
substantive unconscionability claim will be the perpetual release
itself.86 Former athletes will argue that while it may have been
foreseeable at the time they entered into the contract, despite its
procedural unconscionability, that they were giving up their image
rights for the duration of their college careers, it was not
reasonably foreseeable at the time of contract that they would be
handing these rights over to the NCAA for eternity.87 If the class of
former athletes can successfully show elements of procedural
unconscionability and substantive unconscionability-through the
NCAA's oppressive terms and extension of those terms into
perpetuity without contractual justification-there is a strong
probability that a court will deem Form 08-3a unconscionable and
void.
C. The Rule of Reason
The rule of reason applies when a restraint challenged as
unreasonable is not a per se violation of the Sherman Act.88 Rule of
reason analysis takes a formulaic approach: (1) a plaintiff must
demonstrate that a restraint has had substantial adverse anticompetitive effects; (2) the defendant must show that the conduct
promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective; and (3) the
plaintiff must demonstrate the restraint is not reasonably
necessary to achieve the stated objective.89

86. See Wetzel, supra note 4 (interviewing O'Bannon's attorney Michael
Hausfeld, who states that there is no actual perpetual release by former
athletes for universities or the NCAA to use image rights, however, these
entities exercise these rights anyway). Later, the article quotes O'Bannon
saying, "When you're in school you're obligated to live up to your scholarship. .
. . [b]ut once you're done, you physically, as well as your likeness, should leave
the university and the NCAA." Id.
87. See Amer. Bankers Mortg. Corp., 75 F.3d at 1412 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a mortgage contract was not unconscionable despite the presence
of elements of adhesion). However, assuming for the party seeking
unconscionability, that termination clauses in a mortgage contract were
adhesive, the court held that the party seeking unconscionability had failed to
establish that the disputed provisions were not within their reasonable
expectations at the time the contract was entered into. Id. As a result, former
athletes will argue that while it may have been foreseeable at the time they
entered into the contract that they were giving up their image rights for the
duration of their college careers, it was not reasonably foreseeable at the time
of contract that they would be handing these rights over to the NCAA for
eternity.
88. Cont? T.V., 433 U.S. at 49.
89. Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065
(11th Cir. 2005).
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1. SubstantialAdverse, Anti-Competitive Effect
A finding of a substantial adverse anti-competitive effect
requires a showing of four factors: (1) that the defendants
contracted or conspired among each other; (2) that this led to anticompetitive effects within the relevant product markets; (3) that
the objects of that contract or conspiracy were illegal; and (4) that
the plaintiffs were injured as a proximate result.90
The plaintiff former athletes will attempt to show a
conspiracy by arguing that the NCAA, CLC, and other defendants
engaged in a group boycott that, through their signing of Form 083a, barred former athletes from receiving compensation for their
image rights.9 ' The anti-competitive effect within the market is a
lower number of distributors of collegiate athletes' images, which
in turn would lead to less competitive distribution market,
meaning higher prices for consumers of collegiate memorabilia. 92
The objects of the contract are illegal as demonstrated by the
analysis of unconscionability relating to Form 08-3a. If the release
is procured through a void and unenforceable contract because
that release was never substantively consented to, then the NCAA
is using illegal instruments to further this anti-competitive
restraint on the market.93 Finally, the proposed injury to the class
is that they have been deprived of their ability to sell licenses of
their images, and as a result, have been denied compensation after
their college careers for the use of their images.94
90. Rossi, 156 F.3d at 464-65 (3rd Cir. 1998).
91. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, IT 2, 193-95. This group boycott
includes a concerted refusal by the NCAA and its licensing partners to
compensate athletes for use of their images, concerted action to coerce consent
on a yearly basis in the administration of Form 08-3a, and an ongoing effort to
deny compensation for the continued use of former athletes' images. Id. 1
193-95.
92. McCann, supra note 7. Because the NCAA obtains current athletes'
authorization for use of image rights, those athletes are unable to negotiate
their own image rights once leaving college. Id. Without this policy (perpetual
release via Form 08-3a), there would be a more competitive market for sales
because there would be more sellers of licenses, thus driving prices down for
consumers. Id.
93. See Wetzel, supra note 4 (noting that reform in the NCAA's licensing
policy is "a long time coming" because the Association retains licensing rights
that continue forever by arbitrarily extending Form 08-3a into eternity).
94. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, IN 25-34. The complaint cites
examples of sales in which the NCAA and CLC has profited off of the image of
O'Bannon and others for a profit. Id. For instance, the NCAA and its partner,
Thought Equity Motion, sell a two disc DVD package titled "1995 Men's
Basketball National Championship Box Set" for $39.99. Id. 1 26. This box set
is marketed to consumers with the phrase "Ed O'Bannon, earning MOP
honors, lead UCLA back to prominence by defeating Arkansas 89-78. . . ."Id.
While the NCAA explicitly refers to O'Bannon in order to induce consumers to
buy the discs, O'Bannon receives no compensation for the use of his image. Id.
The most highly publicized use of current and former athletes' images
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2. Pro-Competitive Objective
In rebuttal, the defendant in rule of reason analyses is
required to demonstrate a sufficiently pro-competitive objective.9 5
The NCAA's response to these former-athlete antitrust claims is
simple: the administration of Form 08-3a is meant to further the
NCAA's promotion of amateurism, 96 and the precedent on this
matter overwhelmingly states that actions done for this purpose
do not violate the Sherman Act because they will generally lead to
reasonablerestraints of trade.97

at issue is in video games. See Kriegel, supra note 8 (branding NCAA
"hypocrisy" as "faux amateurism" with a principle purpose of maximization of
profit). The O'Bannon class action alleges that video games by makers such as
EA Sports use photograph-like realism, and while not identifying players by
name, they use "uniquely identifiable idiosyncratic characteristics of real-life
players." Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, 1 141. O'Bannon argues that
because no right to use these life-like images of players was ever validly
obtained, any use of the likeness of a current or former player is the direct
result of the NCAA's anticompetitive dominance of the market for these
images. Id. 1 148.
O'Bannon's analysis of action-figures, trading cards, and posters is
particularly interesting as O'Bannon reveals that former college star athletes
are being paid by McFarlane Toys to be depicted in their college uniforms. Id.
1 133. In obtaining the license to use these images, McFarlane Toys has to
contract CLC. Id. After obtaining the license, McFarlane pays the school for
the use of the uniform, and then the player for the use of his likeness in a
particular action-figure contract. Id. The class action alleges that because the
CLC has participated in such a deal, this is an express recognition that former
athletes are entitled to a sum of money for the use of their image. Id. 134.
95. Rossi, 156 F.3d at 464.
96. See McCann, supra note 7 (providing a possible perspective of the
NCAA, that without the bylaws and releases such as Form 08-3a, the sport
would become increasingly professionalized). If the student-athlete became
more professionalized, NCAA compliance with standards like Title IX would
become more difficult, and there could be a substantial economic divide
between student athletes based on marketing appeal. Id. Furthermore,
professionalization of the student-athlete would practically invite the
influence of "unsavory businesspersons" such as agents, scouts, and marketing
teams to college campuses across the country, and these are the type of people
whom the NCAA amateurism rules guard against in the first place. Id. But see
Marlen Garcia, Class-Action Suit Filed vs. NCAA Over Use of Players'
Likenesses, USA TODAY, July 22, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college
/2009-07-21-ncaa-class-action-lawsuitN.htm
(quoting Richard Southall,
director of the College Sport Research Institute at the University of North
Carolina in stating that collegiate athletics are clearly commercial in nature
and the only people who are excluded from the market are the athletes who
make it viable).
97. See Nagy, supra note 38, at 349-58 (analyzing the many decisions that
weigh antitrust challenges to the NCAA's amateurism rules in favor of the
NCAA); Lazaroff, supra note 35, at 344-49 (arguing that while courts have not
ruled in favor of the plaintiff who challenges amateurism rules, there has at
least been a move toward a breaking down of any distinction between NCAA
athletes and other market participants).
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3. Not Reasonably Necessary to Achieve Objective
The identity of the damages class, plaintiffs as former
athletes, rather than current athletes, will be beneficial. While
courts since Board of Regents have construed NCAA rules in
pursuit of amateurism to be valid restraints of trade, the crux of
O'Bannon's argument as a former athlete is that any NCAA
regulation of him in his post-collegiate career, or post-amateur
competition life, is not reasonable to further the ideal of
amateurism in college sports.9 8 Proposed less restrictive means
that are available to the NCAA that will still allow for the ideal of
amateurism to stay in place exist and include: group-licensing
methods to share revenues among teams and players, the creation
of trust funds for health insurance, educational and vocational
training, or student-athlete pension plans. 99
III. ARE THERE MORE DESIRABLE ALTERNATIVES TO NCAA POLICY?

Because of the potential antitrust ramifications of the
O'Bannon complaint, the NCAA may need to consider alternatives
to the methods currently used to procure image rights over
athletes without compensation.
A. O'Bannon's Modest Requests
O'Bannon's class action seeks a declaratory judgment that
any release, such as Form 08-3a, that was signed by the athletes
be ruled unenforceable.100 Furthermore, the suit requests that the
NCAA and its licensing partners be permanently enjoined from
the use of release agreements that make college athletes renounce
their image rights in perpetuity.1 01 Throughout the complaint,
O'Bannon lists several alternative means the NCAA might
consider that would be less restrictive than the current "zero
18 (noting that less
98. See Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5,
restrictive means are available to the NCAA. Under its current system, the
NCAA provides "zero compensation" to former athletes for the use of their
images in a $4 billion market).
99. Id. See also Pekron, supra note 33, at 54-62 (arguing more radically
that the notion of amateurism in NCAA sports should be eradicated
completely for several reasons such as: the NCAA's regulations are not
narrowly tailored to withstand an antitrust challenge, college sports are
already professionalized where athletes compete in markets that generate
millions of dollars for schools and other organizations, and that it is a fallacy
that consumers prefer a product labeled "amateur").
100. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, 1 F.
101. Id. I H. O'Bannon's suit also seeks treble damages for three times the
C. Furthermore, the suit seeks
amount sustained by the class. Id.
disgorgement of all profits earned from the alleged wrongful use of player
D-F. See
images with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest added. Id.
also McCann, supra note 7 (noting that potential damages in this case might
range from tens of millions of dollars to possibly hundreds of millions).
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compensation" policy.102 These include:
group licensing
agreements similar to those used by professional leagues,10
pension plans for former athletes, vocational training for life after
collegiate sports, and the creation of funds for health insurance for
former athletes.104
B. More Radical Solutions
The O'Bannon complaint proposes simple reform to NCAA
practice and bargaining policy.105 However, in analyzing the
NCAA's antitrust armor, some scholars have argued that more
radical, wide-sweeping reform of NCAA policy as it relates to
amateurism and antitrust law is necessary.106
1. JudicialReform

In challenging the NCAA's antitrust exemption from suit,
arguments must at least implicitly assume that the current
system of judicial restraint is unreasonable. 0 7 Since Board of
Regents, courts have easily found in favor of the NCAA whenever
challenges to its amateurism rules have been brought. In some
instances, courts have dismissed claims without even applying the
rule of reason framework to assess the merits of the antitrust
claim.1os In other cases, courts have applied the rule of reason
analysis only to affirm the notion that any NCAA regulation in
pursuit of amateurism is pro-competitive and reasonable. 0 9
102. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, 18.
103. See Liz McKenzie, NCAA Slams Antitrust Suit over Athlete Licensing,
LAW 360 Oct. 14, 2009, http://www.law360.com/articles/128302 (stating that
the NCAA is the only sports association that does not offer players a licensing
deal, whereas the major sports leagues have group licensing policies that
share revenues among players).
104. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, 18.
105. See discussion supra Part III(A) (stating that O'Bannon's lawsuit has
sought a declaratory judgment that Form 08-3a be unenforceable and that the
NCAA employ less restrictive means than its "zero compensation" policy).
106. See Lazaroff, supra note 35, at 361-71 (proposing a shift in judicial
philosophy regarding NCAA antitrust claims, possible NCAA regulatory
reform, and Congressional regulation of NCAA practice); Peckron, supra note
33, at 41-66 (arguing that the NCAA does not create a product that is
necessarily amateur in nature, and as a result, the amateurism exemption
from antitrust suit is unreasonable).
107. See Lazaroff, supra note 35, at 362-66 (arguing that courts' deference to
the NCAA in antitrust suits fails to recognize that student-athletes are a part
of a commercial endeavor).
108. See Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746 (dismissing an antitrust complaint
against the NCAA because NCAA amateurism rules benefit players and
college football consumers (fans) by preserving amateur appeal while
advancing the stability and integrity of college football programs).
109. See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1344 (ruling an antitrust suit in favor of
the NCAA because "each of these regulations represents a desirable and
legitimate attempt to keep university athletics from becoming professionalized
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An argument centering around judicial reform tends to oversimplify the process by which judicial standards are overturned.1 0
Courts hearing antitrust attacks on NCAA amateurism rules since
Board of Regents have been deferential to NCAA policy and have
relied on arbitrary precompetitive justifications for these rules."'
Despite this, courts have applied the rule of reason to NCAA
amateurism rules, and strong precedent has been established that
NCAA amateurism regulation will be reasonable even when courts
apply a less deferential approach.11 2 As a result, it is unlikely that
over twenty years of judicial precedent will be overturned in favor
of a more cynical level of judicial scrutiny.113 Furthermore, while
wide-sweeping judicial reform in the NCAA antitrust framework
would be beneficial in the case of Form 08-3a, the current system
may not prevent a ruling in favor of a plaintiff challenging the
NCAA's unconscionable bargaining practices.114

2. NCAA Regulatory Reform
Judicial reform would be favorable for NCAA antitrust suits
moving forward. However, as it relates to procurement of image
rights in perpetuity, it is akin to trying to kill a fly with a
sledgehammer. O'Bannon does not intend to undermine the
to the extent that profit making objectives would overshadow educational
objectives); Banks, 977 F.2d at 1090-91 (holding that NCAA amateurism
regulations are reasonable as they maintain "a clear line of demarcation
between college and professional" sport which is a precompetitive
justification).
110. See Lazaroff, supra note 35, at 364-65 (arguing that courts should apply
the rule of reason in NCAA antitrust suits with more skepticism than has
been used since Board of Regents because the judicial assumption that NCAA
amateurism rules are precompetitive is an unsubstantiated conclusion that
was reached without proof of its truth). At the very least, Lazaroff argues,
courts should apply a rule of reason analysis to NCAA antitrust suits so that
the burden is shifted to the NCAA to prove that its anti-competitive rules
actually promote the objectives that it sets forth. Id. at 365.
111. See, e.g., Lazaroff, supra note 35, at 359 (arguing that NCAA
justifications for disallowing player compensation are illegitimate because
players are essentially paid through the economic benefit that they receive in
the form of an athletic scholarship).
112. See discussion supra note 109 (describing two instances where federal
courts considered antitrust attacks on the NCAA's amateurism regulations on
the merits).
113. Since Board of Regents, courts have consistently relied on dicta stating,
"it is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA
are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams
and therefore precompetitive because they enhance public interest in
intercollegiate athletics," in order to uphold virtually all NCAA amateurism
regulations. 468 U.S. at 104.
114. See Thamel, supra note 71 (quoting O'Bannon's advisor and organizer of
the O'Bannon case, Sonny Vacarro, "I'm not looking to overthrow the
government or the NCAA, I'm looking to do the right thing. They don't own
[student-athletes] and they're going to have to explain it.").
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NCAA's role as a purveyor of amateurism in collegiate sports.115
Because O'Bannon does not seek to change the ideal of
amateurism in the NCAA, one need only look to narrowly tailored
ways to rectify the NCAA's unconscionable bargaining practices.
a. Eliminating the Ambiguity in Form 08-3a
The core of O'Bannon's lawsuit against the NCAA is that by
signing Form 08-3a student-athletes relinquish their image rights
in perpetuity. 116 The procurement of the signature is allegedly
achieved because the document is purposely misleading and
ambiguous, and it is signed under duress without informed
consent.11 7 The result of this process is that the NCAA purports to
obtain the athletes consent to this form, when athletes are never
given a reasonable opportunity to consent in the first place.
By asking for declaratory judgment that Form 08-3a be
void,118 the lawsuit seems to ask for the simplest reform possible:

that Form 08-3a be eliminated from the NCAA eligibility process,
or that it at least be modified so that athletes actually consent to
the content of the form. A reading of Form 08-3a quickly evinces a
sense of ambiguity about what the form is meant to do. Form 083a is administered by the NCAA for the purpose of "promotion of
NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities, or
programs of college athletics."119 There is no mention of release of
image rights for eternity on the face of the document,120 nor does
Form 08-3a inform athletes that they are relinquishing their legal
rights to the NCAA.121

The NCAA could effectively rectify this ambiguity by simply
changing the wording of the document, so that any right that is
relinquished is apparent in its clear language.122 Because the
115. See Wetzel, supra note 4 (quoting O'Bannon, "when you're in school
you're obligated to live up to your scholarship, but once you're done, you
physically, as well as your likeness, should leave the university and the
NCAA.").
116. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, 1 66.
117. Id. T 9.
118. Id. TH.

119. Id. 1 69. The complaint alleges that no reasonable person would read
the NCAA release documents and interpret the phrases used therein (for
example, "support educational activities") to grant the NCAA a license to use
player images for a profit into eternity. Id.
120. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AsSOCIATION, supra note 13. While
the document states that the signing athlete authorizes the NCAA to use
his/her name or picture to promote NCAA championships, there is no mention
of a time-frame for which the NCAA retains this right. Id. at 4. Furthermore,
the document does not state that the images may be used for profit by the
NCAA or its partners (for example, CLC), nor does it mention the type of "use"
that is involved. Id.
121. Id.; Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5, 1 70.
122. See discussion supra note 14 (exploring O'Bannon's allegation that
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Form is administered on a yearly basis to players, this could be
enacted fairly easily. While this type of reform would change the
way the NCAA interacts with its athletes, 123 it could effectively
eliminate the procedural and substantive unconscionability that
are present in the current administration of Form 08-3a.124 By
stating in Form 08-3a that image rights were released in
perpetuity, the terms of the contract would be reasonable, and
former athletes would have no argument that such a release was
not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the contract's creation.
b. Ambiguity Concerning Student-athletes and Lawyers
The O'Bannon complaint argues that the NCAA manages to
obtain adherence to the terms of Form 08-3a by failing to inform
student-athletes that they may obtain legal advice. 125 The role of
lawyers in the NCAA amateurism rules is important and may be
confusing for athletes hoping to secure amateur eligibility. 1 26
While the NCAA rules proscribed against player-agent
relationships are heralded by the NCAA as a means to protect
student-athletes from exploitation, in effect, they contribute to an
inequitable bargaining relationship between the NCAA and
student-athletes. 127 On its face, this appears to be a broad reform,
requiring the NCAA to advise student-athletes of the importance
of legal counsel and of ways in which student-athletes can obtain
counsel. 128 However, it would not change the current bylaws of the
NCAA, which only ban representation for promotion of one's
abilities. This proposal, on the other hand, encourages informed
decision-making and promotes an equitable relationship between
the NCAA and student-athletes. 129
students who sign Form 08-3a are ill-informed of their legal rights and that
the NCAA does not even instruct students that they may seek legal advice
prior to relinquishing their image rights).
123. McCann, supra note 7.
124. For more information on procedural and substantive unconscionability,
see discussion supra Part I(D), Part II (B) (elaborating on the elements of
procedural and substantive unconscionability and analyzing whether the
doctrine of unconscionability applies to the current administration of Form 083a).
70-72.
125. Complaint for O'Bannon, supra note 5,
126. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 15,

Bylaw 12.3.1, at 69 (stating that a student-athlete will be ineligible if he/she
has entered into an agreement with an agent for the purpose of marketing
his/her abilities in that sport). This type of bylaw may create ambiguity about
what types of activities a student-athlete may consult a lawyer about.
127. McCann, supra note 7.
128. Id.
129. Id. McCann also lists counter-arguments that the NCAA would provide
for this proposal. Namely, critics of this argument would counter that the
agency bylaws are in place to protect athletes from "swindlers" and
"charlatans." Id. Such athlete-lawyer relationships would create anxiety that
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IV. CONCLUSION
Through its administration of Form 08-3a, the NCAA has
unconscionably and illegally obtained rights over former athletes'
images for eternity. Securing these image rights results in a
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act as an unreasonable
restraint on trade. There are several less restrictive alternatives
that the NCAA could choose to employ in order to obtain these
image rights for eternity. The simplest remedy in this instance
would be for a declaratory judgment deeming Form 08-3a
unconscionable, which would force the NCAA to change its
practice. If the NCAA rewrote Form 08-3a, eliminating the
ambiguity of the contract that secures perpetual image rights over
athletes, it is likely that informed consent to the contract could be
achieved, and Form 08-3 would simply be an unambiguous means
of securing amateur ideals in collegiate sport.

these "swindlers" and "charlatans" would have easier access to college
athletes. Id. This easy access would be paired with weakened regulation
regarding student-lawyer relations. Id. Critics would also maintain that
advocating the presence of a lawyer at the signing of release forms would
create a drawn-out "litigious experience" for the NCAA and athletic
departments. Id.

